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 NOTE 
Immunity from Wrongful Death Liability: 
How Mickels Fails to Compensate 
Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) 
Kevin Buchanan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wrongful death statutes originated out of a need to compensate the family 
of a decedent “whose life was wrongfully taken.”1  Closely related to wrongful 
death statutes are survivorship statutes, which allow for the transmission of tort 
claims after the death of one or more of the parties.2  These statutes help address 
the once common maxim that it’s cheaper to kill a man than to maim him.3  
Today, all fifty states have both wrongful death and survivorship statutes.4 
In Mickels v. Danrad, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to allow 
wrongful death claims where a defendant’s negligence accelerates the death of 
a terminally ill decedent.5  However, the court determined that a decedent’s 
family may have a survivorship claim for personal injuries not resulting in 
death.6  In doing so, the court perpetuated a trend that fails to accomplish the 
intended goal of wrongful death statutes: to compensate a decedent’s family.7 
Part II of this Note looks at the facts and holding of Mickels.  Part III 
examines the wrongful death and survivorship claims as well as the past prec-
edent of such claims in the context of medical malpractice and improper diag-
noses.  Part IV then introduces the wrongful death and survivorship issues pre-
sented in Mickels.  Finally, Part V distinguishes Mickels from precedent and 
argues in favor of the dissent. 
 
* B.A., New York University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like 
to extend a special thank you to Professor Philip G. Peters and the entire Missouri Law 
Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044 
(1965). 
 2. Id. 
 3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 4. Jonathan James, Comment, Denial of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries 
Under Washington’s Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes: Is It Really Cheaper to 
Kill a Man Than to Maim Him, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 666 (2006). 
 5. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Joseph Mickels, Sr., visited the Hannibal Clinic in Hannibal, Missouri, on 
December 8, 2008, “complaining of numbness and tingling in his left arm and 
leg, blurred vision, and headaches.”8  An MRI9 was conducted on Mr. Mick-
els’s brain.10  Raman Danrad, a radiologist and the defendant in the instant case, 
reviewed the results of the MRI on December 12.11  Dr. Danrad concluded that 
Mr. Mickels’s MRI indicated no signs warranting a medical diagnosis.12 
On February 17, 2009, Mr. Mickels went to Hannibal Regional Hospital 
suffering from what was only described as an “altered mental status.”13  That 
same day, a computed tomography (“CT”) scan14 was conducted on Mr. Mick-
els’s brain.15  Again, Dr. Danrad reviewed the results of this scan.16  Based on 
the CT scan, Dr. Danrad diagnosed Mr. Mickels with a terminal and incurable 
brain tumor.17  On June 12, 2009, Mr. Mickels died as a result of this tumor, 
despite having undergone immediate treatment following his diagnosis.18 
On June 7, 2012, Ruth Mickels, Joseph Mickels, Jr., Billy Joe Mickels, 
Brittany Mickels, and Jennifer Unglesbee (“Appellants”) filed suit against Dr. 
Danrad pursuant to Missouri’s wrongful death statute, Missouri Revised Stat-
utes section 537.080.19 
Appellants alleged that, although “Mr. Mickels certainly would have died 
. . . with or without Dr. Danrad’s alleged negligence,” Mr. Mickels would not 
have died on June 12, 2009, had Dr. Danrad properly diagnosed the brain tumor 
 
 8. Mickels v. Danrad, ED 101147, 2014 WL 7344250, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 
23, 2014), vacated en banc, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016). 
 9. “MRI” is the common name for “Magnetic Resonance Imaging,” which “is a 
non-invasive imaging technology that produces three dimensional detailed anatomical 
images without the use of damaging radiation.  It is often used for disease detection, 
diagnosis, and treatment monitoring.”  Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), NAT’L 
INST. OF BIOMEDICAL IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, https://www.nibib.nih.gov/sci-
ence-education/science-topics/magnetic-resonance-imaging-mri (last visited Aug. 26, 
2017). 
 10. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. A “CT Scan” is “a computerized x-ray imaging procedure in which a narrow 
beam of x-rays is aimed at a patient and quickly rotated around the body, producing 
signals that are processed by the machine’s computer to generate cross-sectional im-
ages – or ‘slices’ – of the body.”  Computed Tomography (CT), NAT’L INST. 
BIOMEDICAL IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, https://www.nibib.nih.gov/science-educa-
tion/science-topics/computed-tomography-ct (last visited Aug. 26, 2017). 
 15. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; MO.  REV. STAT.  § 537.080 (2016). 
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following the initial MRI on December 8, 2008.20  Mr. Mickels’s treating on-
cologist testified that while the tumor “was incurable when it was found and it 
would have been incurable at the time” of the initial MRI on December 8, 2008, 
it was “more likely than not that if [the tumor] had been discovered earlier . . . 
[Mr. Mickels] would have lived an additional six months on average.”21 
The trial court granted summary judgment in Dr. Danrad’s favor and dis-
missed Appellants’ petition.  The court found that Appellants could not estab-
lish that Dr. Danrad’s negligence caused Mr. Mickels’s death in accordance 
with section 537.080.1.22  Appellants appealed the trial court’s judgment.23  
The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri under article V, 
section 10 of the Missouri Constitution.24 
The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment and remanded the case.25  In doing so, the court held that because Dr. 
Danrad’s failure to diagnose Mr. Mickels’s incurable brain tumor was not the 
cause of Mr. Mickels’s death, Appellants did not have a cause of action against 
Dr. Danrad for wrongful death under section 537.080.1.26  However, the court 
held that Appellants did have a cause of action against Dr. Danrad under Mis-
souri’s personal injury survivorship statute, Missouri Revised Statutes section 
537.020.27 
 
 20. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328. 
 21. Id. (alterations in original). 
 22. Id.  Section 537.080.1 provides:  
 
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence, trans-
action, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled such 
person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or party who . . . would 
have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured . . . . 
 
 § 537.080.1. 
 23. Mickels v. Danrad, ED 101147, 2014 WL 7344250, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 
23, 2014), vacated en banc, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016).  In an opinion that was later 
vacated, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the trial court’s judg-
ment.  Id.; see also MO. CONST. art. V, § 10 (“The supreme court may finally determine 
all causes coming to it from the court of appeals, whether by certification, transfer or 
certiorari, the same as on original appeal.”). 
 24. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 331. 
 27. Id. at 329; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020.1 (2016) (“Causes of action for per-
sonal injuries, other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health 
or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death . . . .”). 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Wrongful Death and Survivorship 
Historically, common law tort actions involving death suffered from two 
primary limitations that led to major reform.28  First, common law tort actions 
were said to “die with the person of either the plaintiff or the defendant.”29  
Such a policy prevented “a deceased tort victim’s own existing cause of action 
. . . [or] a deceased wrongdoer’s once existing liability” from transferring “to 
the personal representative of either of them.”30  Survivorship statutes that al-
lowed for “the transmission of tort claims or tort liability at death” were en-
acted to address this limitation.31 
The second limitation was that “the death of a human being was not re-
garded as giving rise to any cause of action at common law on behalf of a living 
person who was injured by reason of the death.”32  Due to this limitation, a 
plaintiff had few rights “against another living person for having caused the 
death of a third party whose life was of value to the plaintiff.”33  For example, 
if a defendant caused a person’s death, the decedent’s family could not make a 
claim against the defendant.34  Wrongful death statutes sought to address this 
limitation by “establishing a separate cause of action for the benefit of desig-
nated members of the family of a person whose life was wrongfully taken.”35  
Additionally, such statutes solved the problem of “the much-criticized rule of 
the common law which made it ‘more profitable for the defendant to kill the 
plaintiff than to scratch him’” by preventing defendants from escaping liability 
after the death of a plaintiff.36 
All fifty states now have survivorship and wrongful death statutes, alt-
hough their forms vary.37  In Missouri, “the survivorship statute and the wrong-
ful death statute are mutually antagonistic.”38  “[W]hen the injury alleged did 
not cause death,” Missouri’s survivorship statute, section 537.020 applies.39  
Section 537.080, Missouri’s wrongful death statute, “applies when the injury 
did cause death.”40  
 28. Malone, supra note 1, at 1044. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (quoting 
WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 37. See William A. Gage, Jr., Casenote, Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 
S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986), 18 SAINT MARY’S L.J. 1091, 1094–95 (1987). 
 38. Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 39. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020 (2016). 
 40. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685; see MO.  REV. STAT.  § 537.080 (2016). 
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Missouri’s current survivorship statute provides that upon the death of a 
party to an action for personal injury, a cause of action for personal injury 
transfers to the personal representatives of the deceased.41  In other words, if a 
plaintiff has a personal injury claim but dies before the matter is resolved, the 
plaintiff’s personal representatives may go forward with the claim under the 
survivorship statute.42  Missouri’s current wrongful death statute provides that 
when a person’s death results from the acts of a defendant, the defendant is 
liable for damages.43 
Damages arising under the survivorship statute are not defined.44  For 
claims arising under Missouri’s survivorship statute, courts have held that 
plaintiffs are “entitled to recover only such damages as accrued before [the 
decedent’s] death and which he could have recovered had he survived.”45  This 
recovery may “includ[e] damages for physical and mental pain and suffering; 
loss of wages, if any, from the [event] until his death; and medical and hospital 
expenses resulting from the injuries sustained.”46 
Under section 537.090, wrongful death claims under section 537.080 may 
seek “such damages as the trier of the facts may deem fair and just.”47  In ad-
dition to “pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death,” claimants may also 
be awarded “the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, 
comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which those 
on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such 
death.”48 
 
 41. § 537.020. 
 42. Id. 
 43. § 537.080.  Section 537.080 further provides that damages may be sued for: 
 
   (1) By the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any de-
ceased children, natural or adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father 
or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive; 
   (2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled to bring the action, then by the 
brother or sister of the deceased, or their descendants, who can establish his or 
her right to those damages set out in section 537.090 because of the death; 
   (3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) entitled to bring the action, then 
by a plaintiff ad litem.  Such plaintiff ad litem shall be appointed by the court 
having jurisdiction over the action for damages provided in this section upon 
application of some person entitled to share in the proceeds of such action. 
 
Id. 
 44. See § 537.020. 
 45. Grizzell v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (con-
sidering § 537.020) (emphasis added); see also Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 79 S.W.2d 109, 
114 (Mo. 1934) (noting that the plaintiff administrator is entitled to recover “only such 
damages as accrued antecedent to the death” of the decedent that the decedent could 
have recovered had he lived). 
 46. Grizzell, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1008. 
 47. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (2016). 
 48. Id. 
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Damages under Missouri’s wrongful death statute are consistent with the 
“pecuniary loss rule,” which is the majority rule for damages for wrongful 
death.49  A problem exists with the pecuniary loss rule in that it “effectively 
values human life solely in terms of the monetary benefits the decedent could 
have been expected to bestow upon his or her dependents” while “attach[ing] 
no monetary value to life itself” by not accounting for the decedent’s lost life.50  
In doing so, “[t]he pecuniary loss rule views humans as economic units, not as 
sentient beings who live for purpose and pleasure.”51  Furthermore, Missouri 
courts, along with courts in twenty-seven other states, have rejected awarding 
damages for grief and mental anguish in wrongful death cases.52 
In O’Grady v. Brown, the Supreme Court of Missouri described three un-
derlying goals of Missouri’s wrongful death statute.53  The first of these goals 
is “to provide compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss.”54  Second, 
the wrongful death statute should “ensure that tortfeasors pay for the conse-
quences of their actions.”55  Finally, the statute should serve “generally to deter 
harmful conduct which might lead to death.”56 
B. Medical Malpractice 
There are three categories of malignant diseases that are commonly en-
countered in medical malpractice actions.57 
In the first category, a “cure is probable at the outset, but, as a result of 
negligence, the chance of eradicating the disease has been lost.”58  For exam-
ple, in Mezrah v. Bevis, a physician failed to diagnose a plaintiff’s breast can-
cer.59  The court found for the plaintiff because expert testimony demonstrated 
that, if properly diagnosed, the “plaintiff’s breast cancer ‘more likely than not’ 
would have been completely cured.”60 
 
 49. Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of 
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U.  L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6–7. 
 52. Id. at 28. 
 53. O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 54. Id.; see Price v. Schnitker, 239 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo. 1951) (interpreting sec-
tion 537.090 as not allowing the jury to “take into consideration or award any damages 
on account of the pain, anguish or bereavement which may have been suffered by the 
parents or surviving sister”). 
 55. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 909. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Cyril Toker, The Impact of Gooding on Actions for Malpractice in the Treat-
ment of Malignant Disease, 74 FLA. B.J. 61, 62 (2000). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Mezrah v. Bevis, 593 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 60. Id. (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 
1984)). 
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In the second category, while the patient is living with an incurable dis-
ease, the patient’s “life expectancy, already shortened by the disease, has been 
reduced even further through negligence.”61  For example, in Noor v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., a physician delayed a biopsy of the plaintiff’s breast lump 
for approximately seven months and then made a diagnosis of breast cancer.62  
The plaintiff sued the physician for “negligent diminution in life expectancy.”63  
Her claim was dismissed because the plaintiff was “unable to present any non-
speculative evidence as to what extent, if any, [the physician’s] failure to im-
mediately diagnose [the plaintiff’s] disease added to [the plaintiff’s] decreased 
life expectancy.”64  This category is known as “[r]eduction in [l]ife [e]xpec-
tancy from [n]egligence.”65 
In the third category, the cure for the disease is improbable and “the pa-
tient has died prematurely as a result of negligence.”66  This last category is the 
typical wrongful death case.67  In an ordinary wrongful death case, when a ter-
minally ill patient prematurely dies as a result of a negligent diagnosis, “the 
outcome . . . may depend upon the anticipated length of survival in the absence 
of negligence.”68  If the anticipated survival period “would have been short 
even with proper treatment, recovery appears to be unlikely.”69  However, if 
the survival period “might have been prolonged” with a proper diagnosis, “re-
covery is possible even though, ultimately, a fatal outcome was expected.”70 
In Missouri, plaintiffs must establish three elements for a prima facie 
medical malpractice case.71  First, a plaintiff must prove “that an act or omis-
sion . . . of the defendant failed to meet the requisite medical standard of 
care.”72  Second, a plaintiff must show “that the act or omission was performed 
negligently.”73  Finally, a plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between 
the act or omission and the plaintiff’s injury.”74 
Furthermore, under Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.215, there are 
five categories of damages available in medical malpractice cases: “(1) [p]ast 
economic damages; (2) [p]ast noneconomic damages; (3) [f]uture medical 
damages; (4) [f]uture economic damages, excluding future medical damages; 
 
 61. Toker, supra note 57, at 62. 
 62. Noor v. Cont’l. Cas. Co., 508 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 63. Toker, supra note 57, at 63. 
 64. Noor, 508 So. 2d at 365. 
 65. Toker, supra note 57, at 62. 
 66. Id.; see generally Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985); Tappan v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 488 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); 
Green v. Goldberg, 557 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam). 
 67. Toker, supra note 57, at 62. 
 68. Id. at 63. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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and (5) [f]uture noneconomic damages.”75  Additionally, Missouri Revised 
Statutes section 538.210 creates a cap on noneconomic damages for medical 
malpractice.76  In Watts v. Lester E.  Cox Medical Centers, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri found this cap to be “unconstitutional to the extent that it infringes 
on the jury’s constitutionally protected purpose of determining the amount of 
damages sustained by an injured party.”77  The court reasoned that “[s]uch a 
limitation was not permitted at common law when Missouri’s constitution first 
was adopted in 1820 and, therefore, violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed 
by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.”78 
However, in Dodson v. Ferrara, when applying the statutory damage cap 
to medical malpractice resulting in death, the Supreme Court of Missouri de-
termined the cap was constitutional because “Missouri does not recognize a 
common law wrongful death claim.”79 Therefore, because wrongful death ac-
tions in Missouri are “statutory creation[s]” rather than common law actions, 
such actions are “subject to statutory caps and limitations.”80 
The Dodson court reasoned that there was a public interest in capping 
wrongful death damages in order “to reduce perceived rising medical malprac-
tice premiums and prevent physicians from leaving ‘high risk’ medical 
fields.”81  Nonetheless, by protecting doctors in this way, not only are plaintiffs 
in medical malpractice cases not properly compensated, but attorneys have a 
decreased incentive to take medical malpractice cases.82  This potentially 
makes it more difficult for injured plaintiffs to get into court. 
While the Dodson court noted that “the legislature created the damages 
cap in an effort to reduce perceived rising medical malpractice premiums and 
prevent physicians from leaving ‘high risk’ medical fields,” it did not “evaluate 
 
 75. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.215 (2016).  “Economic damages” are defined as “dam-
ages arising from pecuniary harm including, without limitation, medical damages, and 
those damages arising from lost wages and lost earning capacity.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
538.205(2) (2016).  “Medical damages” are defined as “damages arising from reason-
able expenses for necessary drugs, therapy, and medical, surgical, nursing, x-ray, den-
tal, custodial and other health and rehabilitative services.”  § 538.205(7).  “Noneco-
nomic damages” are defined as “damages arising from nonpecuniary harm including, 
without limitation, pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, physical impair-
ment, disfigurement, loss of capacity to enjoy life, and loss of consortium but shall not 
include punitive damages.”  § 538.205(8). 
 76. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2016). 
 77. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 558 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 80. Id. at 550. 
 81. Id. at 561. 
 82. Carol J. Miller & Joseph Weidhaas, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic Caps 
Unconstitutional, 69 J. MO. B. 344, 350 (2013) (“Where out-of-pocket costs are low, 
there is a disincentive for attorneys to take cases, especially when noneconomic dam-
ages and punitive damages are capped.”). 
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the wisdom or desirability of the policy decisions made by the legislature when 
it passed section 538.210.”83 
C. Past Precedent Regarding Failure to Diagnose 
Prior to 2016, the highest courts of Florida, Ohio, and Iowa addressed the 
issue of wrongful death claims arising from medical malpractice due to a fail-
ure to diagnose conditions that would have resulted in death even if properly 
diagnosed.84  In all three of these cases discussed below,85 the courts deter-
mined that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between the act 
and the plaintiff’s death. 
In Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc., the Florida Supreme 
Court addressed this issue.86  In Gooding, the decedent’s family brought suit 
against a hospital after the hospital’s emergency room staff failed to check the 
decedent’s medical history or to examine the decedent upon his arrival to the 
emergency room with lower abdominal pain.87  The staff failed to examine the 
patient because they were waiting for the doctor who had neglected to respond 
to repeated paging.88  The decedent went into cardiac arrest and died forty-five 
minutes after arriving at the hospital.89  It was later determined that the dece-
dent “died from a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm which caused massive 
internal bleeding.”90 
The court concluded that “a jury could not reasonably find that but for the 
negligent failure to properly diagnose and treat [the decedent] he would not 
have died” because the plaintiff’s testimony failed to prove “that immediate 
diagnosis and surgery more likely than not would have enabled [the decedent] 
to survive.”91  Subsequently, the court found that the plaintiff did not show that 
the defendant could have delayed death.92  The court further held “that a plain-
tiff in a medical malpractice action must show more than a decreased chance 
of survival because of a defendant’s conduct.”93  Hence, “the plaintiff must 
show that what was done or failed to be done probably would have affected the 
outcome.”94 
 
 83. Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 561. 
 84. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 85. Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Cooper v. 
Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by Roberts 
v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); Thompson v. An-
derson, 252 N.W. 117 (Iowa 1934). 
 86. Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1018. 
 87. Id. at 1017. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1017–18. 
 92. See id. at 1018. 
 93. Id. at 1020. 
 94. Id. 
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In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Ohio also addressed this issue.95  In Cooper, the court held that the plaintiff did 
not have a claim for medical malpractice against a doctor who failed to properly 
diagnose the decedent, who died later in the day after being sent home by the 
doctor whom he visited after being hit by a truck.96  The court concluded that 
“the issue of proximate cause can be submitted to a jury only if there is suffi-
cient evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery the 
patient probably would have survived.”97  Such evidence of extended survival 
was not presented.98 
In Thompson v. Anderson, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed this issue.99  
In Thompson, the decedent’s husband sued a doctor after the doctor failed to 
diagnose the decedent with tetanus but instead told her that if she continued to 
experience symptoms the next day, she should go to the hospital.100  The dece-
dent continued to experience the symptoms, and she went to the hospital where 
she was immediately diagnosed with tetanus and treated.101  She died the fol-
lowing day, two days after the doctor failed to diagnose her condition.102 
The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s expert witness testimony “fail[ed] 
to show any probability that the death . . . would not have resulted from tetanus, 
regardless of any negligence or malpractice on the part of the [doctor].”103  Fur-
thermore, the court determined “that any attempt to show that such death was 
caused by any act or omission to act on the part of [the doctor], instead of by 
the disease from which she was suffering, would be pure speculation.”104  
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff lacked a claim for wrongful death.105 
Tappan v. Florida Medical Center, Inc.106 and Williams v. Bay Hospital, 
Inc.,107 both Florida District Court of Appeals cases, precluded wrongful death 
actions but allowed the claims to proceed as survivorship actions.108 
 
 95. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 
1971), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 
1996). 
 96. Id. at 99, 104. 
 97. Id. at 98. 
 98. Id. at 104.  Cooper was later overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Medi-
cal Group, which instead recognized the loss-of-chance theory and followed the ap-
proach of Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 
488. 
 99. Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117, 120–21 (Iowa 1934). 
 100. Id. at 118. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 121. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Tappan v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 488 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 107. Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 108. See id. at 629; see Tappan, 488 So. 2d at 631. 
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In Tappan, the decedent’s wife sued a chiropractor, “alleging medical 
malpractice because of [the chiropractor’s] failure to diagnose the [decedent’s 
incurable] cancer during the period of time he was treating [the decedent] for 
‘back and other pain.’”109  Relying on Gooding, the Florida court held that the 
decedent’s wife did not have a cause for wrongful death because the chiroprac-
tor’s “alleged negligence in failing to diagnose the lung cancer was not a cause-
in-fact of the death” and, therefore, it could not be proven “that with proper 
diagnosis and treatment it was ‘more likely than not’ that [the decedent] would 
have survived.”110  Nevertheless, the court allowed the claim to move forward 
as a survivorship action.111 
In Williams, the court again relied on Gooding in precluding a wrongful 
death action when the results of a chest x-ray showing abnormalities were al-
legedly not reported to the decedent.112  The decedent was diagnosed with in-
curable lung cancer one year after the exam.113  The plaintiff’s expert testified 
that early treatment would have, “within reasonable medical probability . . . 
extended her life several months.”114  The court reasoned that a wrongful death 
claim did not exist because the defendant’s “alleged negligence did not ‘more 
likely than not’ ultimately cause [the decedent’s] death.”115  As in Tappan, the 
Williams court allowed the claim to move forward as a survivorship action.116  
In its reasoning, the Williams court cited to Martin v. United Security Services, 
Inc.,117 which found a “wrongful death statute eliminating claims for pain and 
suffering of the decedent” to be constitutional “because the act provided a suit-
able alternative to recovery of damages for such claims by substituting therefor 
the right of close relatives to recover for their own pain and suffering occa-
sioned by loss of a loved one.”118 
However, in Green v. Goldberg, another Florida District Court of Appeals 
case, the court found that the requirements of Gooding were met when testi-
mony showed that the plaintiff would have survived an additional ten years if 
she had been properly diagnosed with breast cancer.119 
 
 109. Tappan, 488 So. 2d at 630. 
 110. Id. at 631 (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 
1984)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Williams, 471 So. 2d at 628, 630. 
 113. Id. at 628. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 630. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 629 (citing Martin v. United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 
1975)). 
 118. Id. (citing Martin, 314 So. 2d at 769). 
 119. Green v. Goldberg, 557 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per cu-
riam). 
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In 2016, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed the issues of wrongful 
death and survivorship in a claim arising from a failure to diagnose in the in-
stant case, Mickels v. Danrad.120 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In a majority opinion written by Judge Paul C. Wilson, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri held in the instant case that Appellants’ wrongful death claim under 
section 537.080.1 failed because Mr. Mickels’s death was not caused by Dr. 
Danrad’s alleged negligence.121  Nevertheless, the court found that Appellants 
did have a survivorship cause of action for negligence arising from Mr. Mick-
els’s personal injuries under section 537.020.122 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
In determining that Appellants’ wrongful death claim failed under section 
537.080.1, the court reasoned that, while Dr. Danrad’s alleged failure to diag-
nose Mr. Mickels’s brain tumor “certainly injured” Mr. Mickels, “it just as cer-
tainly did not kill him” because the tumor was incurable and terminal.123  The 
court concluded that Appellants failed to prove that Mr. Mickels’s premature 
death resulted from Dr. Danrad’s negligence as required by section 537.080.1, 
and, therefore, Appellants could not sue for wrongful death.124  The court fur-
ther noted that “[e]very state supreme court to address this issue ha[d] reached 
the same conclusion.”125 
The court concluded that, although Appellants did not have a wrongful 
death claim, a claim existed against Dr. Danrad for personal injury under 
“[s]ection 537.020 [which] provides: ‘Causes of action for personal injuries, 
other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to 
the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death.”126  The 
court reasoned that, while “[a]n action for personal injuries that result in death 
 
 120. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 121. Id. at 329. 
 122. Id. at 329–30.  The court further noted that “Mr. Mickels [had] no claim for 
‘lost chance survival’ . . . because all parties concede he could not have survived his 
brain tumor regardless of whether Dr. Danrad was negligent in reviewing Mr. Mickels’ 
first MRI.”  Id. at 329 n.3. 
 123. Id. at 329. 
 124. Id.; see MO.  REV. STAT.  § 537.080.1 (2016) (“Whenever the death of a person 
results from any act . . . .”). 
 125. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 329 (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 
So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984)); see also Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, 272 
N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971); Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117, 120–21 (Iowa 
1934). 
 126. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 329 (quoting MO.  REV. STAT. § 537.020 (2000)). 
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may only be brought under [section 537.080] . . . actions ‘other than those re-
sulting in death’ may be brought under” section 537.020.127  As a result, Mr. 
Mickels could have filed a personal injury claim against Dr. Danrad before he 
died.128  Under section 537.020, this personal injury claim passed on to Mr. 
Mickels’s personal representatives after his death.129 
Therefore, the court determined that a personal injury claim against Dr. 
Danrad could be made by Mr. Mickels’s personal representatives.130  This was 
the same approach taken in the two previously mentioned Florida cases, Tap-
pan131 and Williams.132 
Additionally, the court determined that allowing Appellants’ wrongful 
death claim would be “contrary to [the Supreme Court of Missouri’s] precedent 
and the language of the wrongful death statute.”133  Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that allowing the wrongful death claim could cause unintended conse-
quences in future wrongful death claims.134  The court noted that, among such 
consequences, the precedent created by allowing Appellants’ wrongful death 
claim would create a “new element of proof for wrongful death plaintiffs (i.e., 
that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence the decedent would not have died on 
the specific time and date).”135 
The court emphasized that this new element would allow defendants in 
future wrongful death claims to “argue that, even when his or her negligence 
caused the decedent’s death, some [other] conduct . . . either accelerated or 
delayed that death and, therefore, that conduct – not the defendant’s negligence 
– was the ‘but for’ cause of the decedent’s specific date and time of death.”136  
The court concluded that allowing a survivorship personal injury claim under 
section 537.020 avoids the potential problems by eliminating the requirement 
of proving causation at the time of the decedent’s death.137  The court deter-
mined that the time of the decedent’s death should only be considered in the 
damages analysis.138  Therefore, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment 
and remanded the case.139 
 
 127. Id. (quoting § 537.020). 
 128. Id. at 329–30. 
 129. Id. at 330. 
 130. Id. at 331. 
 131. Tappan v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 488 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 132. Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 133. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 331. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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B.  The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Richard B. Teitelman authored a dissenting opinion joined by 
Judge Laura Denvir Stith and Judge George W. Draper, III.140  In reasoning 
that a reversal of the trial court’s judgment was proper, the dissent emphasized 
that but for Dr. Danrad’s negligence, Mr. Mickels would have lived up to six 
months longer.141  Therefore, the dissent concluded that the majority failed to 
consider “that what results from the loss of an opportunity to delay death is 
death.”142 
They wrote that the majority erred in holding that section 537.080 re-
quires the alleged negligence to be “the sole and exclusive cause of the 
death.”143  The dissent further stressed that “[t]here is nothing in the plain lan-
guage of section 537.080 that compels the conclusion that a physician who 
negligently causes the premature death of a patient is immunized from wrong-
ful death liability because, by a stroke of perverse luck, the patient also suffers 
from a terminal illness.”144  Furthermore, they pointed out that, under the ma-
jority’s interpretation of section 537.080, tortfeasors are immune “from wrong-
ful death liability when they kill the terminally ill.”145  Such an immunity is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the wrongful death statute.146  Finally, the dis-
sent stressed that the Florida, Ohio, and Iowa cases relied on by the majority 
were “decided between 30 and 83 years ago [and] should not be conclusive 
with respect to interpretation of the language in Missouri’s wrongful death stat-
ute.”147 
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that it would be proper to reverse the 
judgment and remand the case.148 
V.  COMMENT 
Under the majority’s decision in Mickels, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
essentially granted immunity to healthcare providers who negligently treat ter-
minally ill patients.  This Part first distinguishes Mickels from the previous 
cases on which the court’s decision relied.  Next, this Part argues that the ma-
jority’s decision is inconsistent with the purpose of Missouri’s wrongful death 
statute. 
 
 140. Id. (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 332. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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A.  Relation to Past Precedent 
The majority’s decision relied on cases from Florida, Ohio, and Iowa.149  
All three of these cases were decided over thirty years before Mickels, and none 
of them are mandatory authority in Missouri.150  Moreover, the cases are not 
entirely analogous to the situation in the instant case. 
In Thompson, the Iowa Supreme Court denied recovery because there was 
no evidence that the decedent would have lived any longer even if she had been 
properly diagnosed with tetanus.151  The court stated that, while it is not neces-
sary that “the causal connection between the alleged acts of malpractice and 
the death of appellant’s decedent . . . be shown by direct and positive evidence,” 
there must be evidence that the causation theory be “reasonably probable . . . 
and more probable than any other hypothesis based on such evidence.”152  The 
court found that any argument that the decedent would have lived longer 
“would be pure speculation and conjecture.”153 
Like in Thompson, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cooper denied recovery 
because there was not sufficient evidence that it was probable that the decedent 
would have survived treatment and surgery for his injuries arising from being 
hit by a truck.154  In Gooding, the Florida Supreme Court relied on Cooper, 
finding that there was no “evidence of a greater than even chance of survival . 
. . in the absence of negligence.”155 
Mickels, however, is different from these three cases.  In these cases, the 
plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants could have delayed the decedents’ 
deaths if the decedents had been treated competently.156  On the other hand, in 
Mickels, there was direct evidence that Mr. Mickels would have survived 
longer if treated competently.157  There was direct evidence that Dr. Danrad 
could have delayed Mr. Mickels’s death.158 
In Thompson, Cooper, and Gooding, the time of death for all three dece-
dents would not have significantly changed but for the alleged negligence.159  
That was not the case in Mickels.160  While there was no evidence of the dece-
 
 149. Id. at 329 (majority opinion). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117, 121 (Iowa 1934). 
 152. Id. (quoting Ramberg v. Morgan, 218 N.W. 492, 497 (Iowa 1928)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 99, 104 (Ohio 
1971), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 
1996). 
 155. Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984). 
      156. Id.; Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104; Thompson, 252 N.W. at 121. 
 157. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 328 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Thompson, 252 N.W. at 121; Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104; Gooding, 445 So. 2d 
at 1020. 
 160. See Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328. 
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dents’ probable survival in Thompson, Cooper, and Gooding, there was evi-
dence of Mr. Mickels’s probable survival for a longer period of time had Dr. 
Danrad correctly diagnosed his tumor.161  Mr. Mickels’s treating oncologist 
testified that, but for Dr. Danrad’s failure to diagnose the brain tumor on De-
cember 12, 2008, it was “more likely than not that . . . [Mr. Mickels] would 
have lived an additional six months on average.”162  Even though Mr. Mickels 
would have died from his brain tumor regardless of when it was diagnosed, he 
was still deprived of several months of his life.163  Obviously, six months is 
significantly longer than the expected survival of the decedents in Thompson 
and Cooper – who died the day after the alleged negligence – or the decedent 
in Gooding, who died forty-five minutes after the alleged negligence.164 
As noted in Judge Teitelman’s dissent, section 537.080 does not require 
that a defendant’s negligence be the sole and exclusive cause of a decedent’s 
death.165  While “‘the death of a person results from’ medical negligence when 
the decedent would not have died ‘but for’ the alleged negligence,” the same 
can be said when “a terminally ill person would not have died prematurely but 
for the alleged negligence.”166  Section 537.080 allows wrongful death actions 
“when death ‘results from’ negligence.”167  Mr. Mickels’s death on June 12, 
2009, resulted from Dr. Danrad’s failure to diagnose his brain tumor.168 
Although this survival period is less than the ten-year survival period 
found to be sufficient in Green,169 six months is still a significant amount of 
time that he could have lived.170  Life should not be “devalued . . . when the 
days remaining are few.”171  Instead, “the law . . . should hold that very com-
modity to be more, rather than less, dear.”172  Even though he would have even-
tually died from the terminal brain tumor, there is certainly value in the six 
months of life Mr. Mickels lost.  In a survivorship action, the value of these six 
months would be lost because damages would be limited to those accrued be-
fore Mr. Mickels’s death.173 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (alteration in original). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Thompson, 252 N.W. at 118; Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 99, 104; Gooding, 445 
So. 2d at 1017. 
 165. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. (quoting MO.  REV. STAT.  § 537.080 (2000)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 328 (majority opinion). 
 169. See Green v. Goldberg, 557 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per 
curiam). 
 170. See Toker, supra note 57, at 63.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Grizzell v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (S.D. Ill. 2009); 
see also infra Part V.B. 
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B.  The Purpose of Missouri’s Wrongful Death Statute 
As indicated above, there are three main purposes of wrongful death 
claims under section 537.080.174  First, wrongful death claims “provide com-
pensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss.”175  Second, wrongful death 
claims “ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions.”176  
Finally, wrongful death claims “deter negligent acts that may lead to death.”177  
As noted by Judge Teitelman in his dissenting opinion, barring the wrongful 
death claim in Mickels “certainly does not advance [any of these] statutory pur-
poses.”178 
Wrongful death claims allow for damages including “the pecuniary losses 
suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of 
the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, coun-
sel, training, and support.”179  Survivorship claims only allow for the “damages 
as accrued before [the decedent’s] death and which he could have recovered 
had he survived, including damages for physical and mental pain and suffering; 
loss of wages, if any, from the [event] until his death; and medical and hospital 
expenses resulting from the injuries.”180 
While permitting Mr. Mickels’s family to recover personal injury dam-
ages under the survivorship statute allows the family some financial compen-
sation, this compensation cannot take into account injuries like loss of consor-
tium or loss of companionship.181  In denying such damages, the majority ne-
glects to consider the value of Mr. Mickels’s life.  Although many people may 
“consider life priceless, . . . we [should not] treat it as worthless.”182  The six 
months of life Mr. Mickels lost had value.  Even though Mr. Mickels would 
have only survived an additional six months, compensation for his lost life is 
appropriate.  Because Mr. Mickels lost a portion of his life due to Dr. Danrad’s 
negligence, the damages recoverable in a survivorship claim are not adequate.  
Because damages like loss of consortium are not recoverable, a survivorship 
claim under section 537.020 fails to “provide compensation to bereaved plain-
tiffs for their loss.”183 
Furthermore, the majority decision fails to ensure tortfeasors pay for the 
consequences of their actions because it “immuniz[es] tortfeasors from wrong-
ful death liability when they kill the terminally ill.”184  
 174. See supra Part III.A. 
 175. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (Teitelman, J., 
dissenting). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (2016). 
 180. Grizzell v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (S.D. Ill. 2009). 
 181. See id. 
 182. McClurg, supra note 49, at 6. 
 183. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. 
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The majority argues that Dr. Danrad could not be liable under a wrongful 
death claim because Mr. Mickels would have died regardless of Dr. Danrad’s 
negligence, and, therefore, Dr. Danrad’s negligence was not the cause of Mr. 
Mickels’s death.185  But it is important to remember that everyone will die 
eventually.  Wrongful death claims are about accelerating the date of death.  
For purposes of wrongful death claims, an act is tortious and causal if it hastens 
death.186 
Furthermore, in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that to satisfy the requirement of proximate causation, 
“the injury must be a reasonable and probable consequence of the act or omis-
sion of the defendant.”187  Additionally, “[t]o the extent the damages are sur-
prising, unexpected, or freakish, they may not be the natural and probable con-
sequences of a defendant’s actions.”188  Here, even though Mr. Mickels was 
experiencing “numbness, blurred vision, and headaches” on December 8, 2008, 
Dr. Danrad failed to make any diagnosis upon viewing Mr. Mickels’s MRI 
results.189  A serious health concern going undetected was certainly a reasona-
ble consequence of Dr. Danrad’s failure to make a diagnosis.  Such conse-
quences are not so “surprising, unexpected, or freakish” as to cut off Dr. Dan-
rad’s liability.190 
Because Dr. Danrad caused Mr. Mickels’s premature death, the major-
ity’s decision fails to ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their 
actions.191  By only being liable for a survivorship claim, Dr. Danrad is not 
being held fully accountable for his negligence.192 
Moreover, the majority’s decision fails to pursue the statute’s objective 
of deterring negligent acts.193  Arguably, the decision has the opposite effect.  
Providing such immunity from wrongful death liability could potentially en-
courage doctors and other healthcare providers to behave negligently when 
dealing with terminally ill patients.  The majority narrowly interprets section 
537.080 in declaring that “Appellants cannot sue for wrongful death . . . be-
cause Dr. Danrad’s alleged negligence did not cause Mr. Mickels’ death.”194  
Such a narrow interpretation “exemplif[ies] and perpetuate[s] the very evils to 
be remedied” by the wrongful death statute.195  By failing to deter negligent 
 
 185. Id. at 329 (majority opinion). 
 186. See Collins v. Hertenstein, 90 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A]n act 
which accelerates death . . . causes death.”) (quoting In re Estate of Eliasen, 668 P.2d 
110, 120 (Idaho 1983)). 
 187. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 865 (Mo. 1993) (en 
banc). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328. 
 190. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 865. 
 191. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 331 (majority opinion). 
 195. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 342, 350–51 (1937). 
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acts, this interpretation is inconsistent with the “legislative policy which is it-
self a source of law.”196 
Meeting these statutory objectives far outweighs the potential conse-
quence of creating precedent requiring wrongful death plaintiffs to prove “that 
‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence the decedent would not have died on the 
specific time and date.”197  However, because death is always inevitable, this 
is implied in all wrongful death cases. 
While the majority finds this new element of proof to have potentially 
“serious and far-reaching consequences,” such consequences pale in compari-
son to the ramifications of granting immunity from wrongful death liability.198  
The majority notes that this element of proof would allow defendants to “argue 
that, even when his . . . negligence caused the decedent’s death, some conduct 
of the decedent (or even a third person) either accelerated or delayed that death 
and, therefore, that conduct – not the defendant’s negligence – was the ‘but for’ 
cause of the decedent’s specific date and time of death.”199  But defendants use 
this defense without the supposed new element of proof whenever the facts will 
support such an argument. 
That is not the situation in the instant case.  No conduct by Mr. Mickels 
accelerated his death.200  No conduct by any other third person accelerated his 
death.201  Mr. Mickels died on June 12, 2009, and his death was accelerated by 
six months due to Dr. Danrad’s negligence.202 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Mickels v. Danrad, the Supreme Court of Missouri failed to account 
for an important fact that distinguishes Mr. Mickels’s case from other wrongful 
death cases: the date of Mr. Mickels’s death was hastened due to Dr. Danrad’s 
negligence.  In this decision, the court failed to accomplish the three main ob-
jectives of wrongful death claims.  First, the Appellants were not appropriately 
compensated for their loss.  Second, Dr. Danrad was not held fully liable for 
the consequences of his actions.  Finally, the court essentially set a precedent 
of immunizing doctors and other health care providers who cause the prema-
ture death of terminally ill patients from liability arising from their actions.  
The majority’s ruling is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the wrongful 
death statute.  The decision in Mickels evinces a desire to protect health care 
providers in Missouri at the expense of their patients.203 
 
 196. Id. at 351. 
 197. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 331. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 328. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See, e.g., Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 561 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (find-
ing that there is a public interest in capping wrongful death damages). 
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